Production Deployment Without Proper Testing Pipeline
9/10 CriticalChanges are deployed directly to production without apparent dev/test/staging environments, causing widespread bugs to affect all users simultaneously. The lack of canary deployments and feature flags prevents quick rollback of breaking changes.
Sources
- Why 80% of CI/CD Pipelines Fail in 2025—and How to Fix Yours | Markaicode
- Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 post mortem
- Continuous Deployment in 2025: What Modern Teams Need Most
- 9 CI/CD Challenges and How to Solve Them - aqua cloud
- I'm kinda shocked (yet not surprised) at how bad railway ...
- Who Was Affected By The Neon...
- The 10 Most Common DevOps Mistakes (And How to Avoid Them in 2025)
- Why You (Probably) Shouldn't Start With an SPA - Simon Hamp
- Anthropic's Development Practices: A Customer's Technical Analysis
- CI/CD DevSecOps 2025: New Practices & Tools - Moltech Solution
- Ssl/tls: A Comprehensive Guide for 2025
- 15 CI/CD Challenges and its Solutions - BrowserStack
- Top 8 C++ developer pain points - Incredibuild
Collection History
You deploy. Something breaks. And there's no plan B. Use blue-green or canary deployments. Automate rollbacks on failure. Always have a rollback.sh or previous image ready.
Incomplete testing. Why it happens: Changes are pushed to production without verifying how HTTPS behaves across browsers, regions, or network types.
Deployments get unavoidably riskier in ways that are super difficult to test because testing distributed systems is really hard.
Why do they do non-critical changes in production before testing in a stage environment?
Differences between development, testing, and production environments can cause unexpected issues in the CI/CD pipeline, resulting in bugs or failed deployments.
Why were they making CDN changes in prod? With their 100M funding recently they could afford a separate env to test CDN changes. Did their engineering team even properly understand surrogate keys to feel confident to roll out a change in prod?
The second incident occurred on May 19, 2025, at 13:17 UTC, triggered by reverting the previous fixes. Configuration regressions were introduced during incident remediation.
Buggy products that require post-release patches/fixes... post release work on patches and fixes (extra work for developers) is becoming more and more common across all sectors.
No apparent dev/test/staging pipeline: Changes deployed directly to production. File access broke for ALL users simultaneously (suggests no canary deployment). No rollback capability: Issues persist for weeks during 'investigation'