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SNI is only supported in TLS 1.x, not SSL 3.0. Additionally, older clients (MSIE on XP, Java 6, Android versions, and some programming languages) lack SNI support, causing certificate errors when multiple certificates are hosted on the same IP address.

15% of publicly accessible certificates are self-signed, expiring twice as frequently as CA-issued certificates. Self-signed certificates require users to bypass browser security warnings, creating friction and opening the door to man-in-the-middle attacks.

The CA-based certificate trust model is fundamentally flawed, with OCSP/CRL revocation verification being nearly useless (soft-fail allows connections despite revocation). SSL pinning is difficult to implement and easy to break. CA infrastructure itself creates risk vectors, and certificate issuance relies on unverified DNS and email.

SSL adds significant computational costs through encryption/decryption and TLS handshake operations, increasing latency. Debugging SSL-related issues (certificate mismatches, mixed-content errors, protocol mismatches) is time-consuming and requires expertise.

TLS protocol design is inherently obscure and complicated, making it difficult to audit and easy to introduce bugs. Issues include missing perfect forward secrecy in many TLS 1.2 ciphersuites, client-only authentication by default, and data leakage about session status and party identity.

Developers struggle to configure SSL/TLS securely, with many systems defaulting to insecure protocols (SSLv3, TLS 1.0/1.1) and weak cipher suites (RC4) that remain enabled despite known vulnerabilities. Balancing security best practices against legacy client compatibility requires expertise and continuous vigilance.